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The semiotic fractures of vulnerable bodies: Resistance to the gendering of legal subjects  
By Nayeli Urquiza-Haas 
Abstract 
While the turn to vulnerability in law responds to a recurrent critique by feminist scholars on the disembodiment  
of legal personhood, this article suggests that the mobilization of vulnerability in the criminal courts does not 
necessarily offer female drug mules a direct path to justice. Through an analysis of sentencing appeals of female 
drug mules in England and Wales, this  article presents a feminist critique of the dispositif of the person and its 
relation to vulnerability. Discourses on dUXJPXOHV¶ YXOQHUDELOLW\PRELOLVe the trope of the colonial victim in need 
of protection, which is often translated into legal mercy. But mercy is rather an expression of biopower which  
inscribes not only fragility onto the bodies of drug mules  by figuring them as exemplar paradigms of colonial 
subjectivity, but also reinvigorates the dispositif of gender implicit in the legal person.  In this set-up, it would 
appear as if law and politics  totalise the registers of life, in this case the contours of vulnerable body.  The article 
suggests we must revisit the image of the wounded body in order to carve out a space for resistance.  Drawing on 
Elaine Scarry and Judith Butler, it suggests vulnerable bodies are marked by a semiotic openness, which renders 
them subject to appropriation but also able to signify the precarity produced by the law through their resistance to 
representation. 
Keywords: Vulnerability; feminism; biopolitics; sentencing; drug mules; pain; legal mercy 
[There is]  no need to hear your voice, when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No 
need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to 
you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re -writing you, I write 
myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still [the]  colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the 
center of my talk [1, 343]. 
1. Introduction: Drug mules, vulnerability and femininity 
In the film Maria Full of Grace [2], the main character is a teenage Colombian woman who is offered drug mule 
work to relieve her economic woes. The movie begins by showing Maria as the sole breadwinner of her family - 
composed of her mother, sister and nephew - working in an exploitative floriculture factory in rural Colombia. 
While at work, she is overcome by nausea while peeling off rose thorns. Right after the manager turns down her 
request for a bathroom break, she throws up on the roses, splashing the PDQDJHU¶VVKRHV,QDGLVSOD\RIDXWKRULW\
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her manager forces her to wash the roses and make up for the work lost as quickly as possible.  Humiliated and 
DQJU\0DULDTXLWV7KLVLQFLGHQWVHWVWKHWRQHIRU0DULD¶VFKDUDFWHUVKHis no gentle rose and will not let anyone 
turn her into a victim. She pricks and fights back, GHILHVKHUPRWKHU DQGVLVWHU¶VELWWHUUHFULPLQDtions for acting 
irresponsibly and refuses to marry her macho boyfriend, convinced she is better alone than in a loveless marriage. 
Pregnant, facing single parenthood, unemployment and the responsibility to sustain her family, she leaves for 
Bogotá to find work as a house-maid.  On the way there, she encounters a handsome young man, a recent 
acquaintance who convinces her to traffic drugs across international borders .     
 The legal reconstruction of women, whose sentencing transcripts I consider in this paper, bear some 
resemblance WR0DULD¶V VWRU\KRZHYHU WKH QXDQFHVLQ WKe cinematic script are drastically simplified into the 
dichotomy of victims and offenders . If Maria had been arrested and tried in England, the fact she was pregnant, 
female, and used by drug traffickers would have been translated by the legal narrative into a question of whether 
she was a vulnerable offender and if so, she deserves the mercy of the court.  In contrast to the movie character, 
WKHOHJDOVFULSWHIIDFHVWKHFKDUDFWHU¶VFRPSOH[LW\ DQGUHGXFHVKHULQWo the archetype of the victimised female drug 
mule. The 2012 Definitive Guidelines for sentencing drug offenders in England and Wales, couched in gender-
neutral terms, presupposes that both women and men may be categorised as µGUXJPXOHV¶ However, the analysis 
on sentencing appeals presented in the first part of this paper suggests that the drug mule category is intertwined 
with the feminization of vulnerability[3], articulated through the distinction between (masculinised) willing drug 
couriers who seek profit and (feminised) drug mules who are pressured into the drug trade. In other words, 
vulnerability is culturally coded along the lines of sexual difference, whereby legal discourse represents the lived 
experiences of female bodies in stark contrast with the paradigm of the non-porous and disembodied legal person 
[4, 5].           
 Such feminization of vulnerability is clear in the film, where 0DULD¶VJHQGHUHG body defines her identity 
and actions. 0DULD¶V  SUHJQDQF\LV FHQWUDO WRWKHFKDUDFWHU¶V arch and it is the event which sets in motion her 
rebellion against her employer, family and boyfriend. She decided to be a single-mother, but she also needed 
money to support her family. Her pregnancy is factually and symbolically central to her story. Even though 
0DULD¶VERG\GRHVQRW\HWVKRZVKHLVSUHJQDQW(she is in the first trimester), the maternal body is evoked by the 
fact she is carrying drugs in her abdominal cavity. In that sense, her womb could be figured as a space where life 
is emerging out but also where deadly cocaine pellets are concealed.1  The cinematic narrative fleshes out an 
                                                                 
1
 While it is commonly assumed drug mules are vulnerable because they swallow drugs  - an act carrying the risk 
of death - GUXJPXOHV¶ YXOQHUDELOLW\LVPRUHFRPSOH[ DQGDUJXDEO\DULVHVIURP WKHOLPLWHG FRQWUROWKH\KDYHRYHU
the process of trafficking drugs across international borders for others .  For example, someone else prepares 
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uncommon register of corporeal vulnerability: a metaphorically ambivalent body that envelopes unborn life but 
also represents a threat to the life of the community. After all, she is carrying an  illicit substance which has been 
described over the last forty years by the global drug control discourse as an µHYLO¶ that endangers public health 
[6]. 0DULD¶VERG\ entangles other contradictory discursive registers  about what is licit and illicit.  As mentioned 
before, the maternal body loaded with drugs signifies both life and death, but it also invokes different narratives 
of conception2QRQHKDQGKHUµGUXJSUHJQDQF\¶LVLPPDFXODWH 2QWKHRWKHUKHUhuman pregnancy is the result 
of pre-marital sexual relations. These multiple meanings converge in 0DULD¶V SUHJQDQWERG\VKRZing how the 
title of the film is incredibly fitting: Maria [is] full of grace.2     
 Despite 0DULD¶V  µIXOOQHVV¶ understood as a story open to multiple interpretations, the law reduces 
vulnerable drug mules to the rigid category of victims. Inspired by critical interventions in feminist legal 
scholarship that critique WKHWURSHRIWKHµLQMXUHG¶ERG\RIFRORQLDOIHPDOH VXEMHFWVas it is mobilised to bring about 
legal reform [7], the first section in this article analyses how vulnerability discourses  are mobilised to obtain the 
FRXUWV¶PHUF\ and depart from sentencing guidelines . I argue that this strategy risks marginalising women even 
PRUH DVWKHFRXUW¶VPHUF\ LVJUDQWHGRQO\WRH[FHSWLRQDOO\ YXOQHUDEOH RIIHQGHUV7KHVHFRQGVHFWLRQanalyzes 
vulnerability discourses through the lens of biopolitics, scrutinising the relation between the trope of the 
vulnerable body and the concept of the legal person. I suggest that the articulation of vulnerable bodies, may be 
part and parcel of the fractures arising as an effect of the legal person [8], interpreted here as a juridical technique 
of subjugation/subjectification that mirrors the hierarchical social ordering of gender. This suggests societal 
gender binaries, such as disembodied masculinity and embodied femininity, are  mirrored in the distinction 
between vulnerable feminised drug mules and masculinised profit-seeking drug couriers. Finally, building on the 
critique of vulnerability, the third section acknowledges the limits of this concept but also its appeal. Instead of 
getting rid of it altogether, this section argues that the biopolitical register in the sentencing of drug mules, here 
represented in the power of vulnerability to subjectify/subjugate the figure of the victimised body, is not as 
totalising as it seems. Drawing on a performative semiotics of the wounded body, it sugges ts that vulnerable 
embodiment itself UHVLVWVODZ¶Veclipsing effect on life.  
                                                                 
their suitcases preventing them from knowing if someone planted something in their bags  or, if they accepted 
carrying drugs, the quantity and type of substance and quantity [62]. 
2
 As it will become clear later, rather than representing the traditional image of the Virgin Mary, Maria could also 
be seen to represent a hysterical woman who rebels against the impossibility of symbolis ing herself and her own 
desires. For an eloquent feminist analysis of the Virgin Mary, see Eluned Summers -Bremmers, where she argues 
WKDWWKHVXEYHUVLYHFKDUDFWHURIWKHK\VWHULFLQ.ULVWHYD¶VSRHWLFYLVLRQRIStabat Mater, is that it confronts readers 
ZLWKWKHµPDWHUQDO ERG\DWWKHSRLQWZKHUHLWLVHIIDFHGE\ODQJXDJH¶[64, p.187].  
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2. Gendering by exceptionality: Inscribing vulnerability on women drug mules  
Even though vulnerability figures heavily in the appeals to mitigate sentences for drug importation offenders, 
particularly women, the meaning given by the courts to the word is quite different from the academic legal 
discourse. Legal approaches to vulnerability describe it as a normative and a heuristic trope, that both shows the 
limits of and recalibrates the idea that legal persons are mere artifices who do not bleed or feel pain  or hunger [9]. 
In this way, the discourse of vulnerability exposes the exclusion of the material/corporeal in the notion of the 
universal rational legal person. By contrast, the meaning ascribed to vulnerability in the sentencing of drug mules  
originally referred only to a characteristic or circumstance that made offenders more likely to accept an offer to 
traffic drugs. In R. v Aramah [10], the first guideline judgment on vulnerable drug importation offenders, Lane 
LCJ GHVFULEHVGUXJ³FRXULHUV´ QRWGUXJPXOHV DV³VWXGHQWs and sick and elderly people [who] are used  as 
couriers for WZRUHDVRQVILUVWRIDOOWKH\DUHYXOQHUDEOHWRVXJJHVWLRQDQGYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHRIIHURITXLFNSURILW«´  
[10, p.193]. However, vulnerability is not enough to afford offenders who traffic Class A drugs (such as heroin or 
cocaine) any mitigation because they are viewed as vital cogs in the drug trade and reduced sentences would not 
deter drug traffickers from taking advantage of these people. As a result, the House of Lords drastically limited 
the effect of vulnerability claims on sentencing. Having deterrence as a primary rationale for punishment, together 
with the limitation on submitting for consideration the personal characteristics or circumstances of the defendant, 
translated into disproportionate sentences for people who had a limited role in the offence[11].    
 In 2012, a new sentencing guideline for drug offences came into effect to increase consistency  and 
proportionality in sentencing, particularly in the case of drug mules. According to the Sentencing Council, ³WKH
VRFDOOHGGUXJµPXOHV¶´ZRXOGEHQHILWPRVWIURP WKHQHZJXLGHOLQHVIRFXVRQWKHUROHRIWKHRIIHQGHUZKLFK³PD\ 
result in a downward shift in sentenceVIRUWKHVHW\SHVRIRIIHQGHUV´[12, p. 4-5]. Shortly after, the Court of Appeal 
clarified the guidelines offered ³a modified and FODULILHG PHWKRG RIUHDVRQLQJ´WKDWLV³is expected to produce 
sentences broadly in line with existing practice´ [13, p. 4]. Despite attempts to clarify existing sentencing 
rationale, recent appellate decisions show a tension between existing practice, which is partly represented by more 
than forty years applying the Aramah guidelines, and WKH6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO¶V VXJJHVWLRQWKDWVHQWHQFHVFRXOG
be lower for drug mules. This tension is most evident in Lewis and Ors [13]. In this case, the Solicitor General 
requested the Court of Appeal revise unduly low sentences given to three men involved in the importation of 100 
kg of heroin and six kg of cocaine. Specifically, the Solicitor General asked the Court to clarify the 2012 guidelines 
DQG³µGLVSHO DIHZ P\WKV¶ DERXWLWVLPSDFW RQWKHOHYHO of sentences for drugs offences´ [13, p. 3]. The most 
LPSRUWDQW µP\WK¶ ZDVWKDWWKHJXLGHOLQHVZHUH QRWLQWHQGHGWRintroduce a wholesale reduction in sentencing for 
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drug importation offences. Following the guidelines and R. v Boakye and Ors [14], the court emphasised that 
sentencing practice was meant to remain consistent with current levels, except in the case of drug mules[14, p. 3]. 
 What is most significant about these two cases is they both draw on a semi-formal distinction between 
drug mules and couriers that did not exist before.3  However, the judicial reasoning behind this distinction was 
already shaped by existing practices where legal mercy was invoked to reduce the sentence of drug mules. The 
2012 Drug Offences Definitive Guidelines (hereafter DG), GRQRWXVHWKHWHUPVµdrug mules¶ RUµGUXJcouriers¶
instead, these roles are represented by the categories of µVXERUGLQDWH¶DQGµVLJQLILFDQW¶roles. Following key words 
in the DG, Hughes LJ concluded that drug mules were SHRSOH³ZKRKDYHEHHQH[SORLWHGE\VHULRXVGUXJVFULPLQDOV 
and peUVXDGHGWRFDUU\GUXJVRIWHQIRUYHU\VPDOOUHZDUG´[14, p. 4]. By contrast, the drug courier was an informal 
definition which referred WR D ³ZRUOGO\-wise offender who trafficked drugs as a matter of free choice for the 
PRQH\´[14, p.10]. But this distinction between mules and couriers is unrealistic as profit and pressure are not 
mutually exclusive [15]. Nevertheless, the court drew these distinctions  referring to indicators listed in the DG 
such as involvement through µnaiveté and exploitation¶ µperforms a lLPLWHG IXQFWLRQXQGHUGLUHFWLRQ¶ µengaged 
by pUHVVXUHFRHUFLRQLQWLPLGDWLRQ¶ [16]. What is not so clear is how the Court of Appeal concluded that a drug 
³PXOH´ LV ³D WKLUG-world offender exploited by others´ [14, p. 10]. Proportionally speaking, foreign female 
offenders represented 46 per cent of the women sentenced for drug importation offences in 2012 [17]. But the 
µWKLUG-ZRUOG RIIHQGHU¶FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQLVDUJXDEO\Dneo-colonial trope that harks back to sentencing cases prior 
to the sentencing guidelines.         
 The characteristics attributed to foreign female drug mules can be traced back to the 1980s case of R.v 
Faluade [18] and the 2004 case of  R.v Attuh-Benson[19]. In the case of the former, Faluade was a Nigerian citizen  
who owned DFKLOGUHQ¶VFORWKing business and was sentenced to four and a half years in custody after being caught 
carrying 95 packages of heroin concealed in her body. The judgment reminds the reader that she gave the border 
authorities a contradictory story about her trip but eventually accepted her guilt, and confessed she was offered 
£2000 to carry out a drug run.  In her defence, she said she did not know the type of drug inside the pellets. Despite 
pleading letters from relatives and members of her community  and evidence of a health condition she suffered, 
the sentence stood. Yet, to loosen the strict effects of the Aramah guidelines on vulnerable offenders, the Court 
conceded in Faluade that courts could depart from the guidelines if the case merited mercy. As stated by Watkins 
LJ ³there are certain cases in which this Court can, in suitable circumstanFHVDFWZLWKPHUF\´ EXW³once a person 
                                                                 
3
 The Court of Appeal in Lewis and Ors actually stated that the new roles (subordinate or lesser, significant, and 
OHDGLQJPLUURU ROGQDPHVXVHGSULRUWRWKHJXLGHOLQHVGHVFULEHGE\+DOOHW /- DV³JHQHUDOVOLHXWHQDQWVDQGIRRW -
VROGLHUV´[13, p.5].  
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knowingly acts as a courier bringing heroin into this country  there is seldom, if ever, room for mercy´[18, p. 2].
 Despite the reluctance to formally grant mercy to drug mules on account of their vulnerability, judges do 
note how stories about vulnerable drug mules - understood generally as poor and disabled, with caring 
responsibilities, histories of mental illness and/or victims of violence - are too common in drug importation  
offences [20].  When confronted with these open and fragile bodies, judges seem to resist the affective or 
V\PSDWKHWLF LPSXOVHV EHFDXVH$UDPDK HOLPLQDWHG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WR GUDZ XSRQD SHUVRQ¶VJRRGFKDUDFWHU RU
vulnerability. As Holland J stated, MXGJHVPXVW³KDUGHQWKHLUKHDUWV´  [21, p.2] to these tragic stories. Aramah is 
that shield which allows judges to harden their hearts against any markers of vulnerability, while Faluade loosens 
the rigidity of heart to some extent. If vulnerable drug mules are already perceived as being all-too-common, who 
could ever fit into this category?        
 Almost twenty years later, another case complicated the scope of the application of mercy. In R.v Attuh-
Benson, a Ghanian pregnant mother was puzzlingly included and excluded from the formula outlined in Faluade, 
which stated that if a person knowingly smuggle drugs, there is limited room for mercy.  At first, the court rejected 
the argument that she was vulnerable because of circumstances or characteristics prior to the offence, noting that 
³VKHZDVDQHGXFDWHGZRPDQ HPSOR\HG DQGOLYLQJ LQDµVWDEOHIDPLO\ XQLW¶´ [19, p.4]. In other words, she was 
not vulnerable because she was not a poor, unemployed, uneducated, single mother. But the court did give her a 
modest reduction as an act of mercy for two reasons: First, because she had been diagnosed with depression as a 
consequence from being away separated from her children and, she was a model prisoner. Although the sentence 
was conVLGHUHGWREH ULJKWDQGLQ WKHFRXUW¶VYLHZ VKH³was not in the category of a vulnerable or inadequate 
person who was driven to commit WKLVRIIHQFHE\KDUGVKLS´ [19, p.4] the court granted a small sentence reduction 
³given this appellant's particular difficulties´ [19, p. 5].  As a suffering mother and selfless caring friend, Attuh-
Benson conformed to the norms of appropriate female behaviour, thus convincing the court she deserved mercy .  
 What the cases related so far have in common is that they show how the court reduced drug PXOHV¶
subjectivity to the subaltern female who have to perform a passivity associated with expected gender roles. If 
these women do not conform to the ideal form of the victim, whether an extremely poor mother or a depressed 
repentant mother from the µthird world¶, they are judged as selfish and financially motivated offenders who were 
FDUHOHVVDERXWVSUHDGLQJWKHµHYLO¶ RIGUXJDGGLFWLRQ[19±22].       
 Far from being a compassionate or protective endeavour, the humanist undertones in the description of 
drug mules from Aramah to Boakye, show that disciplining neo-colonial subjects through the metaphor of injured 
bodies is central to advance Western identities and political projects which GHQ\ ZRPHQ¶V YRLFH DQG WKHir 
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opportunity to represent themselves .  As Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues, the humanist and scientific impulse 
of Western actors fails to acknowledge local specificities and historical processes, producing instead a 
JHQHUDOL]DEOH µSRRUPRWKHU¶ in tKHLUDWWHPSWWRµSURWHFW¶ZRPHQ [23]. This trope risks reducing female drug mules  
to an unspeakable subaltern subject boxed into the categories made by legal, academic, and political actors [24]. 
It is not my intention to dismiss the relevance of proportionality in sentencing and its overall role in criminal law. 
What I do argue is that if drug mules become an HPEOHP IRUµVXIIHULQJ ERGLHV¶[25],  the victory of actually carving 
out a definition by which they can be identified will be utterly pyrrhic because it is based on a limited notion of 
vulnerability. That is, as an exception to the rule. In this case, the rule is the paradigm of the legal person, 
understood as the rational, disembodied, profit-oriented subject of capitalism, which mirrors the traits of the 
professional drug courier.  The trajectory of legal mercy presented here suggests the courts displace vulnerability 
to the margins of the law. This means vulnerability is not a characteristic of the legal person. Instead, it is limited  
here to those women who can represent an absolutely passive injured femininity. As I will argue throughout this 
article, the distinction between mules and couriers actively inscribes the traditional gender division underpinning 
the juridical subject of criminal law and its intersection with subaltern subjectivities. The next section explains  
KRZYXOQHUDELOLW\ DQGVRYHUHLJQµFRPSDVVLRQ¶DIILUP WKHKHWHURVH[LVWPDWUL[ RIWKHOHJDO SHUVRQZKLFKVXEMHFWV
and subjectifies, albeit through µcompassionate¶ techniques of power.  
3. Gender and the dispositif of the person  
Coming back to the link between mercy and vulnerability highlighted in the previous section, Penelope Deutscher 
outlines a similar dynamic in abortion laws, where the vulnerable body of the pregnant woman calls forth the 
mercy RIWKHµFRPSDVVLRQDWH¶VRYHUHLJQ . By intensifying the vulnerability of the pregnant body, one is able to 
suspend the law that usually criminalises and/or restricts abortion to allow the mother to kill the foetus[26]. 
Deutscher argues that abortion legislation is fairly similar in that the possibility to terminate a pregnancy is  posited 
as an exception to the rule. For example, one can abort in many countries if the foetus endangers the life of the 
mother. A merciful exception suspends the sanction against women who break the law that forbids abortions by 
reversing the roles between mother and foetus through the intensification o I WKHPRWKHU¶V ERGLO\ fragility. But 
these exceptions, mobilisHG E\SOHDGLQJWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VPHUF\ reassert the biopolitical regulation of ZRPHQ¶V 
bodies and their reproductive capacity.        
 %HDULQJ LQ PLQG *LRUJLR $JDPEHQ¶V reminder that the state of exception is not only a µWHFKQLTXH RI
JRYHUQPHQW¶EXWDFWXDOO\what comes to constitutes the paradigm of juridical order[27], Deutscher argues that the 
FRQVWDQWFRQILUPDWLRQ RI DERUWLRQ¶V LOOHJDOLW\ WKURXJKLWV H[FHSWLRQDOLW\ reasserts the state¶VLQYHVWPHQWLQ the 
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regulation of ZRPHQ¶V UHSURGXFWLYHOLIH It is important to stress that the logic of exceptionality in abortion laws 
is underpinned by a misconceived fear of the mother, figured through sovereign logic as a potential challenger to 
masculine rule over the power to kill or let live. The biopolitization of maternal bodies through abortion laws 
affirm their value in term of the QDWLRQ¶VUHSURGXFWLYHIXWXUH [26]. But this is only one expression of biopolitical 
rhetoric that ILJXUHV WKH IHPDOH ERG\ DV ³YLWDOO\ FDSDEOH RI YDULDWLRQV RQ UHSURGXFWLRQ UDWLRQDO JRYHUQHG
regulated, restricted, enhanced, stimulated, problematised, medically enhanced, resisted, rejected, DQGVRRQ´ [28, 
p. 223-224]. Thus, Deutscher identifies both a sovereign and disciplinary biopower [26]. Sovereign biopower is 
expressed by grounding of authority in the decision to kill or let live, whereas disciplinary power turns the law 
into a managerial apparatus that shapes and manages life. Despite their different ends, life is the common object 
of both modes of governance. Scholars differ about whether these powers overlap in time or if disciplinary power 
overcame sovereign power [29, 30], while others suggest disciplinary and sovereign biopower is distributed 
differentially across neo-colonial geographies whereby life is affirmed in rich countries while those in the 
periphery are left to die [31].There is an obvious connection between vulnerability and biopolitical governance. 
Vulnerability is at the crossroads of life and death, where it signals an inability to meet basic human needs such 
as having food, a shelter, or being free from violence. Coming back to the example of abortion, Deutscher stresses 
KRZWKHZHDNHQHGDQGIUDJLOH ERG\LVDOVRLPDJLQHG DVLQMXUDEOH 7KHVWDWH¶VLQYHVWPHQWLQWKHSURWHFWLRQRI the 
foetus also means that the mother is falsely figured as threat to the FRPPXQLW\¶V  biological continuity [26]. It is 
no coincidence that spectre of violence haunts vulnerability discourses, considering its etymological roots lie in 
the image of the vulnus (wound). Because the latter is mostly associated with negative situations where embodied 
life is susceptible to injury, those who are deemed vulnerable are subject to the control and management of the 
state [32]. That vulnerability discourses enable the governance of subjects should warrant a careful interrogation 
of how they may reify the very same structures of power that they ought to be contesting. Posited as a risk, 
vulnerability introduces the spectre of existential anxiety which institutions seek to regulate, forecast, manage, 
and distribute any potential harm so as to minimise its occurrence [33]. For example, the criminal justice system 
legitimises pre-emptive interventions because it associates vulnerability with potential harms[34]. On one hand, 
it is not hard to see that foregrounding vulnerable bodies in legal and social discourse demands a constant 
reflection about the type of political projects that lie EHKLQGWKHPRUDO LPSHWXVWRµVDYH¶DZRPHQ¶V OLYHV . At the 
same time, I wonder if it is possible to mobilise social and legal action without making any allusion to vulnerable 
bodies and whether something essential is lost when we try to completely efface them.    
 On that regard, feminist studies offer important insights on the complicated relation between law, bodies 
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and the feminine, including the vulnerable body. Some feminists have embraced vulnerability while others are 
more sceptic about its promises because it is seen as yet another iteration of the oldest IRUPXODLQZRPHQ¶VKLVWRU\
whereby the feminine subject is transmogrified to a passive and objectified reproductive body with no voice. Even 
though liberalism promised greater inclusion, Joanne Conaghan reminds us that the principle of equality formally  
ignored the exclusion of the feminine and relocated characteristics of identity, such as sex-gender, outside of the 
sphere of law, while legal personhood was conceptualisHGE\³LJQRULQJJHQGHUUDWKHUWKDQDFNQRZOHGJLQJJHQGHU´  
[35, p. 132]. Despite the best attempts to exclude gender from legal personhood, gender remains in the background 
and in the foreground. This means femininity appears in law only through figures of speech4- this could be in the 
subtext of a case, a legal text, a judgment, etc. She argues legal concepts are articulated through gender differences, 
making them rhetorically dependant on feminine symbols. And, even though gender differences are constitutive 
of the grammar of law, there is no recognition of their interdependence. As a result, ZRPHQ¶V UHODWLRQVKLSWRODZ
is best characterised as a partial absence of  feminine subjectivity, relegated to the margins of law [36], while the 
figure of the feminine body is predominantly articulated as an object of property which exists only in its 
relationship to men. For example, criminal laZDUWLFXODWHVZRPDQKRRGDVDµERG\-EDJ¶VKDSHGDVDYHVVHOIRUWKH
male phallus or a commodity to capture or appropriate [37].      
 At this point it is worth recalling that the legal person gradually developed out of the intersection between 
Christian and Roman law [38]. At its core, it manifested an impossible unity between various dichotomies, 
whether the divine and the human, or as an artifice of the law foregrounding the perishable human body [8]. This 
dichotomous structure was arguably reproduced by a variety of legal and political thinkers during the early modern  
period [39]. Most importantly, the dichotomy was projected onto the separation between legal personhood and 
specifically sexed feminine bodies. As Thomas Lacquer explains, scientific and political rhetoric posited the 
feminine gender as being identical to biologically differentiated bodies with specific sexual organs. The so called   
µWZR-VH[ PRGHO¶ that emerged in 16th-18th century Europe [40] responded to cultural ideas about gender, yet 
projected it onto the body as a truth inherent in nature; a belief legitimated through scientific rhetoric about 
anatomical sex. This model differed from the onto-epistemological framework operative during antiquity and 
medieval times, which only conceived the existence of one sex, meaning that woPHQ¶V ERGLHVwere simply  
considered as extensions or defective versions of the masculine anatomy.  7UDQVSRVLQJ/DFTXHU¶VDQDO\VLVWRODZ
Conaghan argues that sex/gender became oppositional to the legal order and architecture [35], which had now 
                                                                 
4
 Common law jurists have described law as a beautiful flirty woman, µSDWLHQWKRXVHZLIH¶an old shrew, or an 
erratic careless woman [35]. 
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placed the image of the rational, autonomous, disembodied person of law at its foundation. Likewise, the two-sex 
model mirrored the mind-body dualisms and mechanistic cartographies of the body cemented throughout time by 
the Cartesian tradition, which also found some resonance in the doctrine of separate spheres developed by 
contemporary social contract theories. The latter conflated the sexed body with vulnerability, situating 
vulnerability within the sphere of the private.  For example, theorists like Hobbes and Locke associated 
vulnerability with the sexualised/maternal bodies, deemed to be inherently weak and s ubject to the conquest by 
the opposite sex[35]. This incommensurability between sexed/gendered bodies translated into a radical inequality 
grounded on the inferiority of the female body, excluding women from securing any civil rights or property 
rights[41]. Without legal personhood, women were not the subjects of rights but remained subjected to PHQ¶V 
laws.              
 As my analysis of compassionate sovereignty suggested, discourses of vulnerability foreground the 
concrete fragility of the body. This strategy is a logical step towards closing the gap in the antinomy of legal 
personhood. Current efforts to challenge the historical exclusion of vulnerability in law include its articulation as 
a new ethical foundation for law and justice. This new organis ing trope on the human subject is deemed able to 
unbind the attachment to traditional notions of legal personhood and correct the problems with formal equality  
[42]. But other feminists are hesitant about bridging the chasm between corporeality/personhood by reversing the 
order of the mind/body hierarchy [43]. It is possible that the problem is not so much the artificial character of 
legal personhood, but the hierarchical ordering of gender through the disembodiment/embodiment dichotomy. 
Without questioning this hierarchical ordering, the relation between the vulnerable body and the abstract legal 
person appears as yet another iteration or inscription of the chasm that characterises the metaphysical-moral and 
political-juridical tradition in which the person functions as apparatus of subjection and subjectification  [8].  
Hence, a simple reversal of the components of a dyad may lead to endless repetitions of the apparatus , or as is 
characterised by Goodrich and Parsley, aQµRSWLFDO DSSDUDWXV¶ RUµFLSKHU¶of endless binary relations of exclusion  
that reaffirm the hold of the dispositif [8, 39] (i.e. the universal/particular, masculine/feminine, citizen/non-
citizen). Scientific, legal and political knowledge converge in the dispositif through which hegemonic social 
orders (capitalist, patriarchal, sexist, racist, etc.), are secured [44]. This means the institution of legal personhood 
reproduces heteronormativity through the rhetoric that differentiates sexed bodies. Situated within that matrix, 
compassionate sovereignty is another way in which the dyad is reproduced, in response to the invocation of the 
vulnerable body. But the legal rationality holds the vulnerable body in abeyance to personhood, recognised only 
as an exception to the reasonable, abled-body (masculine) person. This framework is what Parsley labels the 
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µjuridical technics¶ that bind subjects to the caesura and the relation [8], meaning that personhood establishes a 
relation of exclusion that is nevertheless bound to law. Thus, vulnerability is constitutive of the feminine body 
while the legal person comes into being through the figure of the vulnerable feminine body. The paradoxical 
inside/outside space of the margin inaugurates the legal person but it also violently effaces the feminine. In short, 
vulnerable feminised bodies are excluded yet attached to the dominion of law through a relation of opposition to 
juridical personhood.           
 So far, this article has explored the difficulties arising from the biopolitical hold of law over life through 
the trope of personhood and its relation to gender and vulnerability. The following sections identify the fractures 
inherent in the relation between vulnerable bodies and juridical discourses, drawing first on Judith ButOHU¶V 
approach to vulnerability complemented by (ODLQH 6FDUU\¶VSHUIRUPDWLYH VHPLRWLFVRIZRXQGHGERGLHVTogether, 
they offer critical views on how bodies figured as vulnerable resist representation and thus, a resistance tRODZ¶V 
dominion over life.       
4.  Vulnerability and precariousness: Delimiting the sign of violence 
As discussed above, deploying vulnerability is a challenging task for feminist projects that demands awareness of 
vulnerability as a governing mechanism. One of the dilemmas faced in the course of speaking and denouncing the 
violence of oppressive and discriminatory structures is that in so doing, there is a risk of reproducing the sign of 
violence that one wishes to contest. This gesture might reproduce endlessly, meaning that in repeating the image 
of violence to describe what happens to historically oppressed groups we actually reaffirm their marginality  
through the sign of the injury. Aware of this impossible bind, Ann V. Murphy suggests that we also need to devise 
strategies that undercut the sign of violence implicit in the concept of vulnerability. This is because the word 
vulnus does not simply conjure up in the mind an innocent cut or injury to the skin; it is charged wit h imaginaries  
of violence which vulnerability discourses (academic, legal, political) may re-deploy uncritically without 
attending to its effects. Still, if we censor vulnerability, we may also partake in its invisibility and deny that such 
injuries exist and they need to be spoken and represented in a social and political sphere. At the same time, if  
vulnerability is overwhelmingly haunted by the image of violence, there will be limited room to carve out 
alternative meanings [45]. Herein lies the totalising effect of vulnerability: it appears as an existential need to 
safeguard and preserve life. This pressing need also seems to foreclose and limit attempts to pluralise the semantic 
field of vulnerability. Faced with such a daunting diagnosis, Murphy suggests it is necessary to imagine 
vulnerability otherwise, to develop a critical ontology of vulnerability that takes seriously the potential for 
violence but holds it in abeyance[45].         
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  Before venturing into the process of imagining vulnerability otherwise, it is important to stress the need 
to hold in sight the productivity of the image of the wound underpinning the concept of vulnerability and its 
representation in law, where the bounded legal subject is frequently constructed in opposition to the fragile or 
vulnerable body. Otherwise, those attempting WRVSHDNµIRU¶ YXOQHUDEOHSHRSOH may succumb to reproducing and 
concealing its effects, namely by abjecting vulnerability as an exception. Returning to 0XUSK\¶VFULWLTXHWKHOHJDO
person could be seen as that which totalises vulnerability by appropriating the sign of the wound in order to justify 
the need to protect itself against potential future injuries.  It is not by accident that legal personhood is conceived 
DVDERXQGHGLQGLYLGXDOHQWLW\RUDVDµVKLHOG¶ to immunise itself against unwanted intrusions. Gender arguably 
also orients responses to injurability [46], including the belief that erecting borders or immunis ing oneself against 
the prospect of violence[47] is a benign way to pre-emptively counter-act the potential of injury. Expanding this 
analysis to the state, Judith Butler suggests that when a government, institution, etc. figures  itself through the same 
opposition- between vulnerable and  invulnerable- the latter will be more preoccupied with ensuring its own 
preservation yet it also ³HQGV XS FRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKH GHVWUXFWLRQ RI OLIH´ [48, p.110]. In short, violence is 
exponentially reiterated because of the predisposition to strategise pre-emptive attacks against the overwhelming  
prospect of future injuries.          
  It is my view that Butler holds in abeyance the spectre of violence that looms over vulnerability  
introducing the cognate concepts of precarity and precariousness. Although related, these are two distinct concepts 
that shed light on the logic of sovereign invulnerability discussed by unpacking and organise the metonymic 
substitutions of vulnerability. In other words, these concepts delimit analytically the relation of vulnerability with  
openness, dependence, desire, affect, as well as to violence, risk and injury. To be more precise, precariousness is 
understood as modality of being that represents a common dispossession to others rather than an attribute of proper 
beings [49]. Explained otherwise,  human and non-human beings are constitutively bound to each prior to any 
expression of agency, consent, contracts, definitions, or borders [46]. This dispossession is often registered by the 
DIIHFWLYH H[FHVVHVRISDVVLRQUDJHORYH SDLQHWF ZKLFK LQWXUQUHQGHUWKHQRWLRQRIµVHOI¶ DILFWLRQ RIOLEHUDO
individualism. However, when vulnerability is singled out as a characteristic of identity, there is already a process 
of exclusion which disavows this ambiguity and displaces it onto the µOther,¶ propitiating indefinite states of 
precarity [50]. The latter concept embodies the gendered orientations to injurability that also enable the unequal 
distribution of violence through juridical techniques  perpetuating a ³IDQWDV\RIEHLQJLPPXQH WRKDUP´ [51, p. 
318]. To perpetuate this fantasy, violence is mobilised to abject the uncertainty of precariousness, understood as 
a dispossession to others that cannot be defined in advance. So in DQLPDWLQJZRPHQ¶VYLVLELOLW\WKUough the image 
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of vulnerability,  the effects can be the opposite as those intended (protecting), because the imaginaries of violence 
carried over by vulnerability discourse replicates sexist normative expectations  [52]. Following Murphy, the main  
idea proposed here is that vulnerability has been often conflated with both precarity and precariousness. The utility 
of the concept of precarity is that it detaches the sign of violence from precariousness. Indeed, our embodied social 
life should not be totalised by the sign violence; otherwise it succumbs to the political and legal regulatory regimes  
that seek to protect itself and its citizens through practices of immunization. These practices produce in turn 
precarity, understood as the indefinite repetition of the sign of violence [52]. 
5.  Drug war precarity and the criminal justice system 
,KDYHH[SODLQHG KRZSUHFDULW\LVDIRUP RIJRYHUQLQJWKURXJKYLROHQFHRULQ%XWOHU¶VRZQZRUGV³WKHSROLWLFDOO\ 
induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic net works . . . becoming  
GLIIHUHQWLDOO\ H[SRVHGWRLQMXU\ YLROHQFHDQGGHDWK´  [53, p. 25]. Precarity operates through historical structures 
RIUDFLVP VH[LVP DQGFRORQLDOLVP ZKLFKSURGXFHµXQJULHYDEOHOLYHV¶7KLVPHDQ s that some lives are forced to 
live a social death, symbolically and later on, literally. A sign of social death is found in the institutional, political 
and social abandonment which, by way of their invisibility, makes life unlivable for some groups or 
populations[53, 54]. Their pain, injuries and deaths, are invisible and unspeakable, and as such, not counted as 
losses to be PRXUQHG%XWOHU¶VDFFRXQWLPSOLHVWKDWsocial death is being enabled by the totalisation of the discourse 
of vulnerability, which is appropriated by sovereign and disciplinary governmentalities that figure themselves as 
those whose survival is in peril. An example of this is clear in transnational crime governance, where governments 
articulate organised crime as a threat to the rule of law and the survival of the State. 6LPLODUO\ WKHµZDURQGUXJV¶
is articulated in international drug control instruments as a quest for security DJDLQVWDQµHYLO¶ ZRUVHWKDQDQ\RWKHU
form of international crime [6]. Needless to say, this reasoning devalues the lives of people coded as drug 
criminals. When killed through summary executions or tortured by militarised police forces or even military  
forces, their deaths are barely registered as lives to be mourned. Countless reports and academic commentaries 
denounce how principles in criminal and human rights are undermined by the war on drugs[55]. Unfair trials, 
corporal punishment, capital punishment, exploitation, over-incarceration and arbitrary detention, environmental 
degradation, and endemic discrimination, represent only a fraction of the state-sanctioned practices that violate 
international human rights law people associated with illicit drug markets  [55]. 5 In this context, rallying around 
the WURSHRIWKHµH[FHSWLRQDOO\¶ YXOQHUDEOH ZRPDQ  obscures the precarity produced by these punitive laws and 
                                                                 
5
 In the UK, black and Asian  minorities are disproportionately targeted for stop and search regarding drugs and 
more likely to receive a custodial sentence in comparison to white offenders  [64, 65].   
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policies.6           
 What stands out in the analysis of contemporary scene is that precarity is delivered not only by traditional 
public security actors, like police or the military. Instead, pUHFDULW\LVDGPLQLVWHUHG E\µSHWW\VRYHUHLJQV¶, such as 
bureaucrats, experts, and other actors who operate within the state of exception [54]. Whilst Butler specifically  
alludes to the case of terrorism suspects detained in extraterritorial prison [54], a subtle analogy can be found in 
the power of probation officers have over way people are shaped and recognised either as drug mules or as 
couriers. Pre-sentence reports produced by probation officers  rewrite the biography of a convicted offender 
through specific parameters, sometimes medicalis ing or moralising deviance. The judiciary is often reluctant to 
use pre-sentence reports because they are laden with social-work jargon; because they selectively collect  
information; or take information at face value[56]. At the same time, the gradual erosion of jury trials for the sake 
of expedience, combined with reliance of guilty pleas in drug offences, forces the judiciary to rely on these reports.  
Courts and probation service co-construct the vulnerable drug mule, despite their differences. In the end, the voice 
of drug mules is silenced through the various translations performed by both of these actors, whose reasoning is 
framed by the dominant organising categories in their profession (moral, legal, medical, etc.). The point is that 
sentencing judges do not overwhelmingly define vulnerability. Advocates and criminal defence lawyers  have 
exposed the general precarization through drug laws, thus introducing different stories about vulnerability in the 
court, or better said, stories of precarity. For example, Attuh-%HQVRQ¶VFRXQVHOargued that punitive sentences to 
drug offences have a negative effect on drug mules and their families  and many of them come from countries that 
lack social protection necessary to cope with the loss of a family member. Harsh sentences for drug offences were 
not only disproportionate to the individual, but also an infringement to the rights of children in international human 
rights law [19].           
 One could say that in the end, these arguments were defeated. After all, as explained before, the applicant 
was reduced to an exceptionally vulnerable drug mule. The power of subjection and subjectification is evident in 
how she was reduced to a PHODQFKROLF PRWKHU IURP WKHµWKLUGZRUOG¶ who deVHUYHGWKHFRXUW¶VFRPSDVVLRQ<HW 
I want to propose here another way of understanding the multiple discourses of vulnerability converging in the 
criminal courts. To subject and subjectify drug mules , juridical speech relies on performative practices and speech 
acts [48]. When Attuh-Benson refused the guilty plea in her trial, she refused tRLGHQWLI\ZLWKWKHFDWHJRU\RIµHYLO
GUXJWUDIILFNHU¶ DQDPH constructed and cemented over the years through the drug war rhetoric [57]. Her refusal 
                                                                 
6
 Human rights violations in countries and regions with harsh drug laws and militarised police functions 
mobilised to uphold these laws are rampant, affecting not only presumed drug offenders but putting the general 
population at risk of civil and human rights violations too [65±68]. 
15 
 
opened up in turn an opportunity to contest the logic of exceptionality  in previous case law. Recall that the court 
had foreclosed the inclusion of personal characteristic or circumstances as a mitigating factors that only a few 
exceptional people could appeal to. This left Attuh-%HQVRQ¶VFRXQVHO with no other option but to challenge the 
Aramah guidelines as a whole, condemning it for its punitive effects as it LQFUHDVHGSHRSOH¶VSUHFDULW\ In short, 
the FRXUW¶V  monopoly over the meaning of vulnerability was also contested, thus proliferating alternative meanings 
and sites for resistance.  At the same time, the criminal justice system discourages any such acts of heroism. 
Refusing to plead guilty gives one a right to stand trial but it also carries a risk of receiving a higher sentence. 
Until there is a radical revision of drug laws, the courts are bound to repeat mechanically and protect the image 
of vulnerability as exceptional fragility.  Explained differently, Attuh-Benson refused to speak the discourse of 
law and her silence was a brief interval that paused the representation machine whilst opening the d oor to new 
representations. Even if that is the case, the question that continues to haunt this paper is whether resistance to 
representation, compassionate or not, is possible at all.  The next section elaborates on the paradox of 
representation elaborateGE\(ODLQH 6FDUU\¶VVHPLRWLF DQDO\VLVRILQMXUHGERGLHV%DVHGRQWKHVHLQVLJKWV,DUJXH
that vulnerable bodies cannot be completely subjected to the gaze of the witness. 
6. Resisting the witness: Semiotic fractures of the flesh  
As noted before, vulnerability carries over not only the image of a wound but it brings with it also a dense 
imaginary of violence whenever it is used to describe drug mules, we could also characterise appellate courts as 
witnesses of rhetorically wounded bodies. Surely, judges and probationary officers are not exposed to literal open 
bodies. Instead, as Jennifer %DODQJHH¶Vproposes, WKHDFWRIµZLWQHVVLQJ¶LQYROYHVanyone who sees- even if it is 
through metaphors, metonymies, allegories and other tropes - the spectacle of rhetorically wounded bodies- be it 
a victim, a perpetrator, a bystander or simply an audience reading a text. Drawing attention to the rhetorically  
wounded bodies splattering Greek tragedies or Roman martyrological poetry, Balangee suggests that these texts 
emphasise ³YLVXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQXWLOLV ing language to create or describe visual spectacles, merging the linguistic 
DQGWKHLPDJLVWLF´[58, p.3]. Said otherwise, courts are spectators of figurative representations of vulnerability  
presented either in legal or non-legal texts (a probation report, first instance judgments, etc.).   
 And yet, recall that bearing witness to all the different figures of speech substituting for wounded bodies 
is not a dispassionate activity. Rhetorically wounded bodies elicit an affective response, MXVW OLNH 6RSKRFOHV¶
Oedipus shocks readers when he tears his eyes out. Judges might not be so different. The affective impact of 
vulnerable lives on judges, in their capacity as witnesses, is quite evident in the exhortation to µKDUGHQWKHLUKHDUWV¶
to these overwhelmingly repetitive stories of vulnerable drug mules. Witnessing the body in pain reminds us of 
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that experience too.  But this reminder can be quite unbearable, DVVKRZQE\ (ODLQH 6FDUU\¶V  analysis of the 
experience of pain and its relation to language. Extreme pain destroys speech and unravels the mental constructs 
of the world in which we inhabit, sometimes re-shaping benign objects into weapons[59]. To explain what pain 
IHHOV OLNH ZH XVHPHWDSKRUVRI SRWHQWLDOO\ LQMXULQJ REMHFWV)RU H[DPSOH ZH VD\DVWRPDFKDFKHµIHHOV OLNH D
QHHGOHV¶+RZHYHU in the throes of extreme pain, language is most difficult to articulate. Instead, one shouts in 
agony or grimaces.  This experience, which is most real and acute for the one who is in pain, is nevertheless so 
obscure and private that it can be doubted by an observer. Without being able to show what is most real to others, 
the one in pain is further alienated from the social world.     
 According to Scarry, this ontological divide between witness and the person in pain is underpinned by 
WKHERG\¶Vresistance to representation  [60]. Paradoxically, this resistance to representation of the body in pain is 
also what instantiates the labour of giving pain an objective expression which allows someone ³to cope and relieve 
SDLQ¶VGH-REMHFWLI\LQJZRUN´ [59, p. 6]. $V6FDUU\VXFFLQFWO\H[SODLQV ³SK\VLFDOSDLQKDVQRYRLFHEXWZKHQLWDW
last finds a voice, it begins to tell a story, and the story that it tells is about the inseparability of these three subjects, 
WKHLUHPEHGGHGQHVVLQRQHDQRWKHU´ [59, p. 6]. Giving pain a voice is  monumental struggle against its resistance 
to representation. To UHYHUVHSDLQ¶VSRZHU RIGHVWUXFWLRQby forcing it into an objectified state, whether it is in 
language or a material referent, carries many practical and ethical dilemmas. (YHQWKRXJKSDLQ¶VUDGLFDOQHJDWLYLW\
lies at the basis of human destruction, it is also the basis of creation by virtue  of the fragile relation between 
sentience, body and voice. Metaphors materialise sentience in the world. As noted before, one describes pain 
through the metaphor of an agential object, a description that is mediated by our imagination. Yet, the metaphor 
does not substitute the experience at all 7KHPHWDSKRUGHVFULEHVSDLQµDVLI¶ LWZDVFDXVHGE\QHHGOHVEXWSDLQ¶V
origins might have nothing to do with needles. Witnesses may also use metaphors and other tropes to speak about 
RWKHUSHRSOH¶V SDLQ DQGLQMXries. This point is even more important where political violence is at the root of 
extreme wounding and pain, such as in the case of torture and war. In her semiotic analysis of injured bodies at 
war, Scarry illustrates how counterfactual political projects of opposing factions appropriate and substantiate their 
reality through the exposed injured bodies. This is partly because injured bodies KDYH D µIULJKWHQLQJ¶ fluidity 
where:  
[the wound] makes manifest the non-referential FKDUDFWHURIWKHGHDGERG\«>LWLV@DQRQ-referentiality  
that rather than eliminating all referential activity instead gives it a frightening freedom or referential 
activity, ones whose direction is no longer limited and controlled by the original contexts of personhood 
or motive [59, p. 119]. 
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These exposed and LQMXUHGERGLHVDUHWKHPDWHULDO DQGYLVLEOHH[SUHVVLRQWKDWµUHDOLW\LVXSIR r JUDEV¶LQWKHFRQWHVW
of war, and the verbal constructions of politics displace and efface the lives of wounded soldiers. 7KLVµVWDWHRI
H[FHSWLRQ¶ FRXOG ZHOO HFKRWKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQMuridical and biological life in biopolitics. Yet, Scarry is 
pointing out the problems of how the political appropriation7 of the materiality of bodies creates an appearance of 
reality. This means a political entity, a nation or a new political regime, is somewhat fictitious. The fiction lies in 
how it is built on counterfactual projects that lift the material reality from dead bodies and appropriate it, giving 
the appearance of DFRKHUHQWERXQGHGXQLWFDOOHGDµQDWLRQ-state¶, a sovereign ruler, or even a court of law.  In 
6FDUU\¶V DQDO\VLVWKHILJXUH RI WKHsovereign becomes a colossal disembodied voice, vivified both figuratively  
and materially but masked by its role in the proliferation of vulnerable bodies (XSKHPLVPV OLNH µWDUJHWV¶ and 
µFROODWHUDO GDPDJH¶ FRQWULEXWHWRWKHHUDVXUHDQGappropriation of a colossal mass of bodies without voice. These 
metaphors represent an eclipse phenomena, meaning narratives of the world as naturalised orders [61], where the 
production and wounded body is itself obscured, totalised by the voice of the sovereign which presents itself as if 
it had no origin. Power in this view is neither independent nor capable of self-authorship. On the contrary, makes  
believe as if it was the sole author of its own coming into being. Evidently, ³SRZHULVFDXWLRXV´EHFDXVH³LWEDVHV
itself in another's pain and prevents all recognition that there is µanother¶ by lopped circles that ensure its own 
soliSVLVP´ [59, p. 59]. In short, I see this as the process where the ZLWQHVV¶GLVFRXUVHQRWRQO\HIIDFHVYXOQHUDEOH
bodies but LW µVWHDOV¶ WKH PDWHULDO FRQFUHWHQHVVRI LQMXUHG ERGLHV WR VXEVWDQWLDWHDQd legitimise itself as an 
authoritative voice.         
 Although the witness seems to efface completely the vulnerable body, total monopoly over representation 
is theoretically impossible if we bear in mind how the resistance to representation operates . Rather than totalising 
the meaning of vulnerability through the fixed categories of victims or offenders, vulnerable bodies resist 
representation. On one hand, representation is inevitable because pain has to have a referent, even if it is only 
completely metaphorical.  Voice-body and sentience are connected because of the resistance to representation but 
this resistance simultaneously exposes the limits of these connections. In that sense, the referential openness of 
the wounded body could be seen as a figure of potentiality, an un-decidability that registers the potential for care 
or violence in the encounter[45] between witness and injured/injurable bodies. The act of naming someone as 
vulnerable or not involves a political struggle to stabilise the image of the vulnus (wound) which can only be 
                                                                 
7
 Scarry describes in the following quote the confrontation between the witness and wounded body and the 
transformation elicited by its semantic ambiguity, which in this case, points to the question of belonging when the 
ZKROHERG\LVVRUDGLFDOO\ DOWHUWRWKHSRLQWLWEHFRPHVDZRXQG³'RHVWKLVGHDGER\
VERG\EHORQJWRKLVVLGH
the side "for which" he died, or does it "belong"  to the side "for which" someone killed him, the side that "took" 
KLP"´ [59, p. 119]. 
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countered by pluralis ing the meaning of vulnerability as it was done in the appeal of Attuh-Benson. In my reading, 
compassionate appropriations of vulnerability cannot be said to be caring in so far they obscure the precarity 
produced by punitive control drug control regimes.  But I also insist that the resistance to representation represents 
a small fracture in the apparatuses of precarity.8 If bodies resist representation, it is also possible to undercut the 
inertia of the image of violence underpinning vulnerability  by heeding the semantic openness of the wounded 
body. The openness of the wounded body is both subject to the appropriating gaze and the grammar of the witness 
but also open to practices of care. Perhaps what we need to think more carefully is how care is delivered and what 
shape it should take in order to really provide the necessary reprieve for vulnerable drug mules.   On that regard, 
6FDUU\¶VµVWUDQJHPDWHULDOLVP¶ not only provides a sophisticated approach to the relationship between figurality  
and materiality but gestures towards a notion of care that must have tangible effects supporting bodies in pain.9  
7. Conclusion 
This article has offered a critique of how appellate courts have appropriated vulnerability discourses into their 
own schema of intelligibility. As a witness to YXOQHUDEOH µRSHQ¶ ERGLHVWhe law performs as a sovereign that 
effaces wounded bodies and uses them to constitute itself all the while it projects vulnerability onto the feminine, 
thus re-inscribing the abject position of the feminine within the legal order. In that sense, the discourse on drug 
mules considered through sentencing appeals goes beyond a critique of the reductive appraisal of drug mules as 
victims or offenders. Instead, it shows how vulnerable subjects are both constructed in opposition to the bounded, 
rational, legal person and remain constitutive of it.  This dispositif is not infallible: the image that underpins the 
concept of vulnerability (wound) shows that it is possible to resist the representation of life through the figure of 
the person. By exposing the limits to appropriation, this article fleshed out unexplored modes of defiance and 
resistance to the subjectification/subjugation of politics over life in the context of drug control. It suggested the 
subjugation/subjectification of drug mules is never complete because of the semiotic fractures of embodied life 
that resist the paradigm of the legal person and the exceptional victim. This resistance to representation open up 
                                                                 
8
 Indeed, the role of metaphors in bringing into light or relegating to obscurity the lives of injurable bodies finds 
DSDUDOOHO LQ*LOOHV 'HOHX]H¶V H[SRVLWLRQRIWKHdispositif, generally translated as a µVRFLDO DSSDUDWXV¶. The latter 
GLVWULEXWHVWKH³YLVLble and the invisible, giving birth to objects which are dependent on it for their existence, and 
FDXVLQJWKHP WR GLVDSSHDU´[69, p. 160]. $PRQJ RWKHU WKLQJV)RXFDXOW FRQFHUQHGZLWK WUDFLQJ WKH µOLQHV RI
VHGLPHQWDWLRQEXWDOVRWKHOLQHV RI³IUDFWXUH´¶ [69, p. 159] understood also as force vectors generating creative 
thresholds. 
9
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spaces to pluralise the semantic field of vulnerability and expose the precarity produced by law and its  complicity  
with drug prohibition. 
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